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In the large body of literature about the Holocaust and Nazi totalitarianism today, the 
extinction of the European Jewish population is treated as an unparalleled act that cannot 
and should not be repeated. “Never again” has become the motto of commemorations of 
the victims of Nazi terror in general and as such it represents the heart of the politics of 
memory, which, through awareness of the Holocaust’s warning, has attempted to create 
conditions in which the repetition of such an unparalleled crime would be impossible. 
However, in spite of the persistent claims in the genocide scholarship of its uniqueness 
and in spite of the refusal to compare itt to contemporary genocides, the Nazi Holocaust 
has inevitably been linked to the events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. the 
Rwandan genocide, in particular—owing to the number of victims and the way the crime 
was accomplished—has emerged as the most suitable case for emphasizing a “crucial 
similarity,”1 while the name “Srebrenica” has become associated with “the worst massacre 
in Europe after the Second World War.” Conserving the Holocaust as a unique or 
paradigmatic case of genocide or using it as an ultimate standard of moral condemnation 
obviously has had no eff ect, since the new events have evinced similarities to the 
Holocaust, as well as their own uniqueness. The “never again” politics helped neither in 
the understanding nor the prevention of genocidal developments because one could not 
simply learn from the past to prevent future “repetitions.”2 In both these more recent 
cases it seemed as if the “unparalleled” had reappeared, except that the killings on the soil 
of the former Yugoslavia turned out to be exceptional in the European context. 
After the reports of the massacre of Srebrenica in the summer of 1995, questions 
emerged reminiscent of those after the Second World War: How was such a thing 
possible? How could it have happened “again” (in the middle of “civilized” Europe)? Why 
would people kill their co-citizens, sometimes their neighbors and acquaintances? These 
disturbing questions implied a broader frame: Is it possible to explain and (eventually) 
understand such events? Could we possibly prevent them, if we knew their origins and 
recognized them in time? How can we help ourselves with the lessons from the Holocaust 
and totalitarianism?
These questions not only touch upon the issue of “definitions” of genocide, for example, 
or of the potential for a catastrophe such as the destruction of European Jews. They also 
struggle with the moral and political problem of how to make the conditions, “origins,” or 
1  Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton, and Oxford, 2001), 5.
2  On the question of the difference between the Holocaust and genocide, and of the uniqueness of the 
Holocaust, concerning scholarly discourse, see A. Dirk Moses, “The Holocaust and Genocide,” in The 
Historiography of the Holocaust, ed. Dan Stone (Basingstoke, and New York, 2004), 547. On the comparison 
of the Holocaust with the Rwandan genocide, see Nigel Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Post Genocide 
Debates in Rwanda (London, 2004), 51–68.
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elements of such events “visible,” how to “see” that they take place in order to make those 
who can or should prevent them “recognize” them, in the sense of providing adequate 
legal arrangements and/or initiating action. This chapter will engage with some of the 
above questions concerning the background of crimes and mass murders in the former 
Yugoslavia, while aiming at an understanding of the case through the perspective and the 
legacy of Hannah Arendt’s thought.
The Arendtian Legacy and Post-Totalitarian Temptations
In spite of a growing literature on the “social construction” of both ethnicity and war in 
the former Yugoslavia, there still exist two interconnected and widespread explanations of 
the origins of war and mass killings. One is a thesis commonly voiced that people were 
“manipulated” by politicians, while the other involves the “in the beginning there were 
nationalisms” thesis that is partly connected to the former one. Manipulation and 
propaganda were seen as the reputed reasons for nationalist support, and the increasing 
emphasis on nationalisms, which erupted immediately after Tito’s death, were then seen 
as the proper impetus for war. Social scientists have time and again fallen into the trap of 
seeing nationalism as a kind of biological, essential, or natural force, which, as some kind 
of an ever-present virus or contagious disease, “attacked” people in the former Yugoslavia 
or resulted from “ancient hatred,” resulting in war and killing as their almost inevitable 
outcome.3 
Such one-dimensional explanations are among the main reasons that I would like to 
point to some features of Arendtian political thought that might illuminate our 
understanding of some of the terrible events in the former Yugoslavia. The ideas about 
nationalism as “the origin” bear a resemblance to the presumption, rejected by Arendt, 
that an ancient hatred toward Jews—that is, an “eternal” anti-Semitism—was the main 
cause or a even a single explanation for the Holocaust and Nazi totalitarianism, a thesis 
which has been, in the case of German anti-Semitism, recently advocated zealously by 
Daniel Goldhagen.
Arendt refused monocausal explanations in attempting to create an understanding of 
the paths toward totalitarian domination and its novel crimes. On the one hand, she was 
thinking in terms of elements of totalitarianism, which she traced back to history, as she 
was trying to understand them, on the other hand, while taking into account something 
that mainstream social scientists’ methods did not consider: human action, human 
plurality, spontaneity, and the capacity to begin anew—exactly those elements of the 
human condition that totalitarianism was about to destroy.4 This enabled her to argue 
about totalitarianism in a non-determinist and non-causative way, to retrace and discuss 
the elements that she found to be crucial in its development, but to state clearly that it did 
not automatically spring from one single element, or even from a set of them, and that it 
3  There are too many examples to list to them all but one might be the following: “To a historian, today’s 
Balkan crises are rooted in, above all, the crippling dependence of all Balkan peoples on the ideology and 
psychology of expansionist nationalism.” See William W. Hagen, “Balkans’ Lethal Nationalisms,” Foreign 
Affairs 78, no. 4 (1999): 52.
4  Ernst Vollrath, “Hannah Arendt and the Method of Political Thinking,” Social Research 44, no.1 (1977): 166.
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(the tragedy) was thus not inevitable.5 Anti-Semitism, imperialism, racism, and the 
decline of the nation-state were considered as important elements but not single causes. 
They would only “eventually crystallize into totalitarianism.”6 In the absence of causal 
relations, not only was the issue of individual guilt for the crimes strongly emphasized but 
also that of the individual and collective (political) responsibility for not preventing 
totalitarian developments as well. This approach, combining elements and underlining 
human agency in bringing about the political phenomena, resulted in a series of insights 
and lessons that are important for understanding the Yugoslav case.
Furthermore, Arendt did not consider totalitarianism and its threats—although they 
constituted an absolute novelty—to be a fixed and unchangeable evil structure. On the 
contrary, she immediately started to think about the possible “repetitions” and new, post-
totalitarian predicaments.7 Although it is true that the Holocaust and the most extreme 
forms of totalitarian domination have already passed, it remains a fact that totalitarian 
elements—for example racism, bureaucracy, the decline of the nation-state, and various 
forms of totalitarian solutions—“can survive the system in the form of several 
temptations.”8 Arendt thought that the “unparalleled” new crimes that happened under 
Nazi-totalitarianism (such as the constructed superfluity of humans and the destruction 
of plurality, exemplified in the extermination camps) became a precedent, and thus it was 
more likely than before that they would happen again,9 once the “threshold” of 
“everything is possible” has been breached.10 However, they will not necessarily appear in 
their cruellest form;11 they will not “repeat” the identical event: “the true predicaments of 
our time will assume their authentic form . . . only when totalitarianism has become a 
thing of the past.”12 
This new situation and the new predicaments were closely connected with the new 
context emerging after totalitarian experience, with the broken tradition in all itssenses, 
and especially with the impaired standards of political thinking and moraljudgment. 
There are two important issues for the present analysis linked to this new context. One is 
related to the role and the power of ideologies—such as anti-Semitism, racism and, 
associated intrinsically with them, nationalism—and to the role of their transformed 
successors. The other applies to the potential for new crimes, brought about by 
totalitarianism, along with the “nature” of evil and the issue of responsibility. 
5  Arendt considered the title, given by the publisher to The Origins of Totalitarianism, to be inappropriate 
since it conveyed the wrong impression that her intentions were to clarify “origins” and “causes.” Hannah 
Arendt, “A Reply to Eric Voegelin,” in Essays in Understanding 1930–1954, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 
1994), 403.
6  Ibid.
7  She started to think about possible new forms of totalitarianism in the essay “Ideology and Terror,” included 
in the 1958 revised edition of Origins, and she continued with that on the basis of observations of post-
Second World War changes in Germany, of the consequences of the “thaw” in the Soviet Union, of the 
experience of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. and the experience in the United States with McCarthyism.
8  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London, 1986), 459.
9  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York, 1977), 273.
10  Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA, 1998), 181ff .
11  Perhaps, in the future, we will see “large sections of population become ‘superfluous’ even in terms of 
labour,” or we will have to face “the use of instruments beside which Hitler’s gassing installations look like an 
evil child’s fumbling toys.” See Arendt, Eichmann, 273.
12  Arendt, Origins, 460.
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Racism, Anti-Semitism, Nationalism, and the Power of 
Ideologies
Racism, anti-Semitism, and nationalism can be explained as interrelated modern 
ideologies: modern anti-Semitism is a special and principally a totalitarian variety,while 
the other two represent the ideologies of imagined communities (of race and of the 
nation-state). Basically, they each embody sets of attitudes, beliefs, and activities that 
produce and legitimize exclusions from, and inclusions into, imagined communities and 
are essentially linked to the establishment of boundaries between the imagined 
communities and “the Others.” They are thus, as noted by Arendt, intrinsically connected 
to the rise (and decline) of the nation-state and its mechanisms of power. Though the 
ideas of race and nation can overlap, since, as noted by Balibar, “discourses on race and 
nation are never far apart,” nationalism and racism do not represent the same or co-
derivable phenomena. There exists an ambiguous relation between them: nationalism can 
be seen as a determining condition for the production of racism, and racism might 
become a parameter to define nationalism.13 This, however, does not necessarily imply 
that racism is an inevitable consequence of nationalism or that nationalism is impossible 
without latent racism.14 The difference between them is not between the “normal” and 
“extreme” in terms of degree. Both being exclusive ways of human conduct, they 
nevertheless represent two different types of approach to the issue of political 
organization: if nationalism tends to articulate itself in terms of state objectives (either in 
statebuilding or through an ideology such as “self determination”) then racism attempts 
to overcome the state framework.15
This interrelation and opposition—namely, that racism can not be considered as a 
simple “intensification” of nationalism—was clearly observable in the relationship 
between Nazi racism and German nationalism, where racism exceeded and actually 
destroyed the nationalist project and became a goal in itself. Arendt has shown how the 
intersections between both phenomena in the German case and in other Pan-
nationalisms and movements operate to form a new, “advanced” type of nationalism, the 
so called “tribal (völkisch) nationalism,” with “race” as not only an indispensable part of 
its structure but its final target. This type of nationalism does not represent an “excessive” 
or “ultra” nationalism, but it shows a split between “traditional” nationalism, aiming at 
one’s own state, and tribal nationalism, having as its goal an achievement of some kind of 
organic, racialized nation, transcending the boundaries of the nation-state. Tribal 
nationalisms were thus simultaneously an addition to and modification of nationalism: 
they were used as powerful ideologies by those peoples who understood themselves as 
rootless, but as an organic national body, surrounded by a world of enemies such as 
Germany or Russia and dispersed over the home country’s borders. They believed in the 
chosen nature of their own race or people against others, adopted racism as the ideology 
13  Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London, 1991), 37–8 
and R. Miles, Racism after Race Relations (London, 1993), 59.
14  Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class, 37–38.
15  Racism is thus not an “‘expression’ of nationalism, but a supplement to nationalism, or more precisely a 
supplement internal to nationalism, always in excess of it, but always indispensable to its constitution and yet 
always still insufficient to achieve its project, just as nationalism is both indispensable and always insufficient 
to achieve the formation of the nation or the projectof the ‘nationalization’ of society.” Ibid, 54.
4 
Vlasta Jalusic | Post-totalitarian Elements and Eoichmann’s mentality in the Yugoslav War and Mass Killings | 
http://www.hannaharendt.net 
of their national unity, and shared with overseas imperialism a hostility against their 
“narrow’ (nation) state.”16
This transformation of nationalism through the open establishment of a common 
ground between racism and nationalism, shown in the phenomenon of tribal 
nationalisms, was an ideal site for totalitarian policies themselves. It represented, 
together with anti-Semitism as its central component,17 a superb means for the 
destruction of reality (in Arendt’s terms the “world” itself ) and thus for undermining the 
common ground of thinking and judgment. These movements have found an ideal 
“Other” in the fabricated image of the international Jew  “in general,” the“elusive 
enemy,”18 representing the paradigmatic case of neo-racism, “racism without race,” and 
needing no pseudo-biological concept of race or nature, since culture or some other type 
of ideological production can sufficiently replace it.19 Only here anti-Semitism became a 
“pure” ideology, an “outrage to common sense,”20 in the sense of total fabrication. 
However, totalitarian policies are “far from being simply anti-Semitic or racist or 
imperialist or communist.” They “use and abuse their own ideological and political 
elements until the basis of factual reality, from which the ideologies originally derived 
their strength and their propaganda value. . . have all but disappeared.”21 This peculiar 
“self-manipulating” moment in the ideologies of racism and tribal nationalism, hardly 
comprehensible to those whose political action as above all an instrumental activity or 
manipulation of others, might cast light on the means by which totalitarian threats might 
adapt and become “ideologically” functional in the long run. They do so not by building an 
“instrumental” world where everything is “under control” but by creating what Arendt 
called “images,” a “reality” frame, independent of the world, which starts to operate 
through its self-perpetuating logic as “truth.”22 These images function similarly to Erving 
Goffman’s strong discourse, a frame that, once established, is very hard to resist, since it 
functions as reality (“The Truth”) itself regardless of any “real basis” in truth. Since it is 
already permanently “in action,” such an image can finally have perfectly real effects on 
the people’s behaviour and actions. It can justify and normalize all possible deeds, 
including ethnic cleansing, or genocide. The “real” in respect to ideology is thus no longer 
its content or its attempt at indoctrination, but “self-manipulation,” intense “social 
constructionism,” productivity,and creativity. Modern ideologies adopt the mode of 
fabrication, without needing to “indoctrinate” or to constitute a “deep” conviction or 
belief. They seem rather to be a superficial set of fabricated policies of “everyday,” 
“simple,” and “obvious” truths. If we approach it this way, then such an “image” comes 
close to the Arendtian description of the evil as banal: it is nothing deep but is, as she 
16  See Arendt, Origins, 227–243.
17  Richard Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge, MA, 1996), 67.
18  Omer Bartov, “Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust,” American Historical 
Review 10, no. 3 (1998), 771–816.
19  Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class, 22–23.
20 Arendt, Origins, 3–10.
21  Ibid., xv.
22  In “Lying in Politics,” she spoke about such an imaginary enterprise as “image making as global policy.” In 
Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York, 1972), 18–19. About image making as a policy see also 
“Home to Roost,” in Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 2003), 
257–275.
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once put it, after reconsidering her claim about radical evil in totalitarianism, “spreading 
like a fungus on the surface.”23
Between “Structure” and “Intention”: The Banality of Evil and 
the New Crimes?
These considerations are closely connected to the issue of the role played by ideologies in 
the motives of perpetrators, and in the attitudes of bystanders in instances of totalitarian 
temptations and mass murders. Arendt tackled this issue with the articulation of her 
“banality of evil” thesis and presumably reduced the role that she had previously 
attributed to ideology. She challenged the predominant interpretations of genocide and 
crimes against humanity in terms of anti-Semitic indoctrination and anticipated the later 
discussions and results of historical scholarship.24 It is usually understood that the 
“banality of evil” thesis confirms and belongs to what is called the structural-functionalist 
holocaust interpretation camp, which insists on modern structures as the origin for 
crimes “without motives” as a key-factor. This stands in contrast to the ideological-
intentionalist interpretation that insists on the power of indoctrination (presumably of 
ideologies) and on the evil intentions of the perpetrators.25 However, taking a closer look 
at Arendt’s analysis reveals the misunderstanding and misinterpretation behind such 
assumptions,which do not help us to think about the new experiences. With her analysis 
of thoughtlessness, Arendt in fact went beyond this dichotomy (although she insisted that 
she had abandoned the role of ideology in favor of the banality of the perpetrator).26 I will 
try to show later how illuminating this can be for understanding the power of ideologies—
racism and nationalism—in the case of the massive crimes in the former Yugoslavia.
In Eichmann, Arendt revealed a new type of perpetrator, one who committed a novel 
sort of crime, without traditional motives of hatred and without needing to be a 
monstrously fanatic, deeply indoctrinated anti-Semite. He appeared “banal”and 
“thoughtless” in the strict sense of the word, someone who was not able to think about 
23  Hannah Arendt, “Letter to Gershom Scholem,” in The Jew as Pariah, ed. Ron H. Feldman (NewYork, 1978), 
150.
24 Hans Mommsen, “Hannah Arendt’s Interpretation of the Holocaust as a Challenge to Human Existence: The 
Intellectual Background,” in Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, ed. Steven E. Aschheim (Berkeley, 2002), 225–6.
25  This debate was renewed with the publication of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners 
(New York, 1996) maintaining that the main cause of the Holocaust was the German ideology of anti-
Semitism. For more about this debate, see A. D. Moses, “Structure and Agenc yin the Holocaust: Daniel J. 
Goldhagen and his Critics,” History and Theory 37, no. 2 (1998), 194–219, 202ff .
26  Arendt apparently changed her mind regarding the role and power of ideology when reporting about the 
process against Eichmann. She claimed that in Origins she had overstated the influence of ideologies on the 
individual. In her letter to Mary McCarthy on September 20, 1963, she wrote that anti-Semitism itself gets 
lost in the process of extermination and instead the “movement” itself takes the lead. It seems, however, that 
Arendt unconsciously held two notions of ideology: the first concerns the role of ideology as indoctrination 
and is close to the Marxist notion; the second underlines ideological productivity—of totalitarian movements 
and policies, fabricating the frame of “reality” that is comparable to Foucauldian productivity and power of 
discourse. Later, she returned to this ideological productivity—as early as in Eichmannin Jerusalem—when 
claiming that Eichmann had been living in the world of “self-deception”common to millions of Germans and 
thus living in a kind of a “fabricated truth.” She noticed the power of the image when trying to withstand 
incomprehensibly brutal attacks on her book about Eichmann. Many of those who attacked the Eichmann 
book were actually dealing with a fabricated image of it and not with what she really wrote. Hannah Arendt-
Mary McCarthy. ImVertrauen: Briefwechsel 1949 – 1975 (Munich, 1995), 233–4, 238–9.
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what he was doing, although he “knew quite well what it was all about.”27 The main 
controversy provoked by this case became the issue of the intentionality or non-
intentionality of his evil deeds, the question of whether Arendt, by detecting his 
thoughtlessness, had really absolved Eichmann of his deeds and ,instead, blamed the 
victims (Jewish councils). In addition, there was the question of whether (and if so, why) 
she “changed her mind” and abandoned the concept of “radical evil” for that of 
“banality.”28 One of the recent (and paradigmatic) opponents of Arendt, Yaacov Lozowick, 
maintains that Arendt unjustifiably placed the main emphasis on the functional and not 
on ideological causes and completely overlooked the historic fact that Eichmann, together 
with his bunch of fellow bureaucrats, was an indoctrinated anti-Semite. Thus he was, 
contra Arendt, very much aware of his mission, and of what he was doing when sending 
transports of Jews to the concentration camps. This proves his evil motives and 
personality and the non-banality of his deeds, and “cuts the ground from beneath” 
Arendt’s thesis that he was a banal perpetrator.29
Arendt’s point, however, was not at all that Eichmann was not conscious of the effects 
of his actions in the casual sense. On the contrary, she pointed to the fact that he was very 
much aware of the consequences of his deeds.30 Her specific definition of 
“thoughtlessness” was not “mindlessness” or stupidity; it was rather based on the 
difference between knowing and thinking (analysed more closely in The Life of the Mind). 
Thoughtlessness represents a special kind of mentality—not the absence of rational and 
instrumental thinking but of the judging ability and activity, imagination itself. It emerges 
under conditions of inverted human order and represents a shield against reality—in fact, 
a constructed world of self-deception. 
By raising the issue of banality and Eichmann’s thoughtlessness, Arendt was not only 
pointing to a novel type of crime (“crime against humanity” or, beyond that, “against 
diversity” and not solely genocide)31 and proclaiming Eichmann a “hostis generis 
humani.” She was also pointing to their universality and to the enormous potential for 
future repetition,32 as the massive circumstances behind the development of such a type 
27  Arendt, Eichmann, 287.
28 Among recent critiques of the Arendtian “banality of evil” thesis, see Yaacov Lozowick, Hitler’s Bureaucrats: 
The Nazi Security and the Banality of Evil (London and New York, 2002), and Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s 
Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton,NJ, 2001), 31–69. An 
excellent clarification of the relation between radical and banal evil is given in Bernstein, Hannah Arendt, 
137–153. For overviews of the reception of Arendt’s book on Eichmann and the debates about the main 
issues, see: Richard I. Cohen, “A Generation’s Response to Eichmann in Jerusalem,” in Hannah Arendt in 
Jerusalem, ed. Aschheim, 253–277; Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New 
Haven and London, 1982), 328–377; Jennifer Ring, The Political Consequences of Thinking, Gender and 
Judaism in the Work of Hannah Arendt (Albany, 1997); Hans Mommsen, “Hannah Arendt’s Interpretation of 
the Holocaust as a Challenge to Human Existence: The Intellectual Background”; Susan Neiman, “Theodicy 
in Jerusalem”; and Dana Villa, “Apologist or Critic? On Arendt’s Relation to Heidegger,” in Hannah Arendt in 
Jerusalem, ed. Aschheim, 224–232, 65–90, and 325–337. On the intellectual anchorage and universalist 
effects of the notion of the banality of evil, see Richard H. King, Race, Culture and Intellectuals 1940–1970 
(Baltimore and Washington, D.C., 2004), 173–195.
29 Lozowick, Hitler’s Bureaucrats, 230. Lozowick repeats Yehuda Bauer’s judgment, which, however, forgets 
that Arendt never claimed Eichmann’s deeds as ‘banal’ but the perpetrator himself (see King, Race, Culture, 
and the Intellectuals, 189).
30 Arendt, Eichmann, 212ff , 22, 277–8.
31  She considered the Holocaust a crime against humanity “committed on the body of the Jewish people.” See 
Eichmann, 7.
32  See King, Race, Culture, and the Intellectuals, 192.
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of thoughtless perpetrator could only spread and evolve on a global scale. Additionally, 
she stopped judging evil deeds by “intentions” and will but focused her attention on the 
factual effects of deeds.33 Evil deeds and their new perpetrators do not necessarily have to 
look or be represented as monstrous in order to have immediate monstrous 
consequences. They do not have to be acts of an evil “will” or of any will at all. As our 
contemporary circumstances show, they might even present themselves as good and as 
fighting against presumably monstrous evils, which can be fabricated in the form of an 
elusive enemy.
Departing from the lessons about the power of ideologies, the banality of evil, and 
thoughtlessness I have outlined, there are two issues I would particularly like to tackle 
when turning to the Yugoslav case: first, the question of nationalism and the role of 
racism—as powerful ideological means for the mass mobilization and justification of 
violence and killings. Then, I would like to elaborate on the relation of racist and 
nationalist ideologies to the direct mobilization for the commission of crimes and to raise 
the question whether thoughtlessness represents a part of the general “structure” or 
frame that enables such crimes to happen in our time.
Elements of Racism: Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia was a paradigmatic new case in which race thinking, not directly connected to 
any assumed ‘biological’ formulation, began to play an important role in the preparation 
for war, and where the combined elements of race production, mass mobilization, and 
terror influenced ethnic cleansing, mass murder, and post-conflict state building. 
However, racism in particular was overlooked or sidestepped by most analyses, 34 while 
mobilization, war, and genocide were debated in terms of excessive (ethnic) nationalism, 
ancient hatred, and elite manipulation. Except for a few authors, there are few references 
to racism in the literature about the war and the killings in the former Yugoslavia.35 Even 
those analyses that account for elements of racism and refer to ‘racist dimensions’ speak 
mainly about ethno-nationalism, ultranationalism,36 extreme nationalism, or, like 
Branimir Anzulovic in his book Heavenly Serbia, about ethno-tribalism, which comes 
closest to noting racist elements and the issue of tribal nationalist mobilization.37
33  See Neiman, “Theodicy in Jerusalem.”
34  Julie Mertus, “The Role of Racism as a Cause or Factor in Wars and Civil Conflict,” in International Council 
on Human Rights Policy: Consultation on Racism and Human Rights Geneva, (December3–4), 1999, 
(http://www.ichrp.org/ac/excerpts/50.pdf ), accessed 13 May 2005, 1.
35  Michael A. Sells’ The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and 
London,1998) explores “religious mythology, extreme nationalism, and racialist theory” in the case of Bosnia 
(xv). See also David Bruce MacDonald, Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centred Propaganda 
and the War in Yugoslavia (Manchester and New York, 2002), 122ff . and Aleksa Djilas, The Contested 
Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919–1953 (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 107, who both 
underline the importance of racial differences in the process of distinction making between the Serbian and 
the Croatian groups.
36  See J. A. Irvine, “Balkan Authoritarian Ultranationalist Ideology and State-Building in Croatia, 1990–1996,” 
in Problems of Post-Communism 44, no. 4 (2001): 30–44.
37  See Branimir Anzulovic, Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Gencide (London, 1999). Other exceptions besides 
Julie Mertus’s writings are Branka Magas’s refl ections on Milosevic’s Serbia as a fascist state in terms of the 
only remaining “post-Stalinist” state (among the post Yugoslav republics) that “remained largely intact to be 
turned to a racist, even genocidal project”; in Magas, “Milosevic’s Serbia and Ethnic Cleansing: The Making of 
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One reason for the prevailing omission of racism in this literature is certainly its non-
conceptualization as a relevant explanatory moment for the Yugoslav case and the stress 
instead on biological racism, which thus does not link it with what is usually seen as 
nationalism or excessive nationalism.38 Another incentive might resemble the academic 
avoidance of the question of massive popular participation in the Rwandan genocide, 
since it raises unpleasant questions about indifference, conformism, and collaboration39 
and does not tackle the issue of widespread racist thinking among intellectuals. Racism 
might thus be subsumed under the more “respectable” cover of nationalism or “culture.” 
As Etienne Balibar has suggested, a strong emphasis on the distinction between 
nationalism and racism or Nazi-racismcan conceal the racist elements within nationalism 
itself (especially underlining the difference between “normal” and “excessive” forms).40
In what sense can we speak of the power of racism in the 1980s and 1990s in  the 
former Yugoslavia? It should be understood in relation to tribal nationalism as explained 
within its broader and transformative aspect and be tested against the above described 
role and power of totalitarian ideologies. Racism was, of course, not the “cause” of war/s 
in the sense of being the only element that led to the conflict.41 Nonetheless, not unlike 
modern anti-Semitism, which, as Arendt noted, arose from a relatively unimportant 
political phenomenon to became a powerful transformative ideology, in the former 
Yugoslavia a new, transformed sort of racism emerged: it grew out of the nationalist soil 
and cemented various elements and discourses, including nationalist ones, together. Its 
mobilizing force and role are close to the tribal nationalism described in the first part of 
the chapter. It is a paradigmatic case of racism without race: race here is a social 
construction, a result of the essentialization of characteristics attributed to the group(s) 
(racialization) and primordialization of identities, rendering them natural and 
unchangeable. This process of racism was, to be sure, connected to nationalism, and it 
grew up on its own terrain.
Elements of racism in post-Tito Yugoslavia began to unfold with the help bothof the 
masses and the rising elites, there being a need of popular support for their policies in the 
1980s, and in view of the democratic multiparty elections in the1990s.42 These elements 
a Fascist State,” Against the Current 52 (September/October, 1994). Similarly, some analyses speak about 
chauvinism, “bordering on racism,” “racist reasoning,” and about depictions of the Other that are linked to 
racist metaphors. See Robert M. Hayden, “The Triumph of Chauvinistic Nationalism in Yugoslavia: Bleak 
Implications for Anthropology,” Anthropology of East Europe Review 11, nos. 1–2 (1993). As well as the 
exceptions, one must enumerate the problem of Orientalist approaches toward the Balkans. See Maria 
Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York, 1997) and Dusan I. Bjelic and Obrad Savic, eds., Balkan as 
Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation (Cambridge, MA,2002).
38 Such an approach keeps nationalism and racism strictly apart and insists on the fundamental difference 
between them. On the basis of the claim that the Holocaust was about biological racism, one can then refuse 
all comparisons and claims, for example, that the “Balkan ethnic cleansing” was “fundamentally different” 
from the Holocaust, which was a “program of biological extermination based on racist eugenic theories.” The 
fundamental difference is that it “does not require mass extermination but rather mass removal.” See Hagen, 
“Balkans Lethal Nationalisms,” 8 (my emphasis). Such “particular” treatment of “ethnic cleansing” as a local 
peculiarity and a “lesser evil” actually legitimizes it and its methods of annihilation—similar to a very 
problematic scholarly tradition from the first part of the twentieth century.
39  Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 8.
40 Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class, 46–7
41  Mertus, “The Role of Racism,” 1.
42  In an apparent paradox, they coincided with the opening of the public space and the emergence of wide press 
and other media freedom and made possible the public revival and competition of the old debates about the 
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were crucial for the subsequent radical divisions. The consequences of race thinking and 
racism first came into view in connection with policies and police repression in the 
Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo (the Serbian “sacred land” that had an Albanian 
majority—a non-Slavic population) in the early 1980s, long before the beginning of the 
war. The Kosovo problem was the core of the process of the destruction of Yugoslavia, and 
during the process of escalation it became an “abstraction,” a myth. It was there that the 
relations were first racialized and that the difference was framed in terms of quasi-
biological differences and, so to speak, “written on the body.” To understand the 
racialization of relations in the former Yugoslavia, one must consider the attitudes toward 
Kosovo Albanians, since the “Kosovization” of Serbian politics later spread to the whole of 
Yugoslav politics.43
Albanians were the target of Serbian race-thinking even at the beginning of the 
twentieth century: they were, on the one hand, dehumanized and represented as a wild, 
anarchic tribe without history and state—similar to apes and sleeping in trees—“European 
Redskins” who could not govern themselves, a sort of strange, resistant element that 
should be exterminated. On the other hand, they were treated actually as “lost Serbs,” the 
worst converted characters, who had been assimilated through a process of Albanian 
violence, rape, killings, and property theft, since this was the only way to explain the 
preservation and even the demographic growth of Albanians.44 In 1937, a Serbian 
academic, Vaso Cubrilovic, prepared a memorandum to the “solution of the Albanian 
question.” He raised the alarm regarding the “demographic explosion” of the Albanian 
population and suggested that all methods for marginalizing the Muslim-Albanian 
population had so far failed and that one should introduce methods which would 
correspond to the “Western approaches”: the introduction of laws that would make the 
life of Albanians in Yugoslavia unbearable, followed by mass deportations.45
The proposed measures had the character of ethnic cleansing avant la lettre, and they 
point to a very problematic scholarly tradition from the first part of the twentieth century, 
which, based on racist premises, advocated population transfer and exchange as normal 
“policy solutions.”46 Not surprisingly, the discourse of “planned resettlement” was 
restored in the 1980s through intellectual and scientific discussions of the necessary 
voice and standing of particular nations. This shows that—contrary to the common liberal belief that 
governments are the foremost producers of nationalist propaganda and that free speech is the best 
“antidote”—under conditions of incipient democratization and openness of public debate, nationalist myth-
making and ethnic confl ict can befostered and that nationalist and racist ideas can be sold successfully in the 
“marketplace of ideas.” The instances of the media in Yugoslav and Rwandan demonstrate that the impact 
ofnationalist and racist propaganda depends on the “demand,” and the masses are not just the innocent 
victims of elites. See a convincing analysis by Jack Snyder and Karin Ballentine, “Nationalism and the 
Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 5–40.
43  See Julie Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley, 1999), 8–9.
44 See the chapter on Albanians in I. Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia (Ithaca, 1984) and 
OliveraMilosavljević, U tradiciji nacionalizma ili stereotipi srpskih intelektualaca XX veka o ‘nama’ i 
‘drugima’[In theTradition of Nationalism, or Stereotypes of Serbian Intellectuals about ‘Us’ and ‘Others’ in 
the XX Century](Belgrade, 2002), 218ff . It is signifi cant that the so-called “race betrayal” is also a key 
themeof the famous epic poetry written by Njegoš, The Mountain Wreath. The Slavic Muslims were seen as 
“turkifi ed” by having converted to Islam, and this “was not simply to adopt the   mores of a Turk, but to 
transform oneself into a Turk. To convert to a religion other thanChristianity was simultaneously to convert 
from the Slav race to an alien race.” Sells, The BridgeBetrayed, 45.
45  Wolfgang Petritsch, Karl Kaser, Robert Pichler. Kosovo, Kosova: Mythen, Daten, Fakten (Klagenfurt,1999), 
113–128.
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demographic policies to hinder the supposed “demographic genocide” of Serbs in Kosovo. 
Dobrica Cosic, a member of the Serbian Academia of Sciences, a novelist and confirmed 
dissident, who became president of Yugoslavia in 1992 and belonged among the 
intellectuals who formed the new Serbian Kosovo platform after Tito’s death, stated in 
1991: “Planned resettlement and population exchanges, while most diffi ult and most 
painful, are still better than a life of hatred and mutual killings.”47 In this process, 
Albanians were represented once more as dangerous, sly intruders who threaten “our” 
families, women, property, graves, and tradition and who can conspicuously misuse their 
own sexuality and rape or attempt to rape “our” women from sheer “separatist” motives. 
Here, the image of the “Other” was successfully combined with the image of an intruder, a 
settler, who is occupying and taking over “our land.” This image of the intruder or settler 
acquired the status of an elusive enemy, which could later be applied easily to the Muslim 
population in Bosnia, who were targeted as “Turks.”48
Through the prototype of the racialized Other, Albanians were not the onlyc ase of 
racialization. In the second half of the 1980s, the “clash of civilizations” loomed large—
one could see derogatory images of a presumed Balkan and uncivilized enemy throughout 
Yugoslavia. The “Balkan man” was depicted as lazy, indifferent, and violent; and 
contrasted with images of a diligent, hard working, honest,c ivilized non-Balkan man. 
West-east and north-south divisions paved the way for the Europe-Balkans dividing line 
in these boundary drawings. They divided Yugoslavia itself and helped to reinforce the 
already existing Western racist-cultural prejudices and images that conditioned later 
problematic responses to the massmurders. The Slovenian and Croatian media and 
cultural elites tried to classify themselves as more civilized than the others and to place 
themselves on the “European” side of the demarcation line between Europe and 
Yugoslavia. They did soby enforcing an image of the “Balkans” as violent and macho, lazy 
and backward, fatalist, fraudulent, and cunning. The “North” or “West” saw itself as 
defending and cherishing European culture against the sinister backdrop of the wild, 
dark, orthodox, oriental, and Islamic Balkans. Yet the “eastern” part of Yugoslavia, on the 
other hand, worshipped its own putatively ancient, traditional, hospitable, and “anti-
fascist” values. From that perspective, Slovenians were characterized as feminized, weak, 
exploitative, cunning, selfish, and calculating, whereas Croatians were positioned as more 
Western but also as Nazi-followers, and the supposed similarity of Croat and German 
characteristics of evil with bellicose traits emphasized (Croats who “speak Croatian but 
46 The measures—the agreed transfer of the 200,000 Albanians, Turks, and Muslims from Kosovoand 
Macedonia to Turkey—were not carried out, owing to the outbreak of the Second World War and for other 
reasons. However, between 90.000 and 150,000 Albanians left Kosovo at that time. Petritsch, et al,. Kosovo, 
128. On the issue of “ethnic cleansing,” see Tone Bringa, “Averted Gaze: Genocide in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” in Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton 
(Berkeley, 2002), 204–5 and Milosavljevic, Utradiciji nacionalizma. Bringa rightfully problematizes the 
terms “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” in the Yugoslav conflict, showing how the use of “ethnic cleansing” 
(denoted as a “lesser evil”) supported nonintervention policies and the relativization of crimes and how the 
term genocide was misused by the Serb leadership and propagandists. Ibid., 203–4.
47  Olivera Milosavljevic, “The Abuse of the Authority of Science,” in The Road to War in Serbia:Trauma and 
Catharsis, ed. Nebojsa Popov (Budapest, 2000), 302.
48 Mamdani shows how the Rwandan genocide took place as a ‘native genocide’ and how the Tutsi were 
constructed as ‘settlers’ to be targeted as intruders and not neighbors. Mamdani, WhenVictims, 10ff .
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think ‘German’”).49 Albanians, Muslims, and Roma were in the worst position. In fact, to 
all those who shared a Slavic language, Albanians represented the “‘Other’ within.”50
Tribal nationalism
The racialized picture created more room for the revivals of the old nationalist debates in 
the 1980s, with racial images assuming an inseparable part. The Memorandum of the 
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, produced in 1986, was a paradigmatic example of 
such a problematic “national programme.” It united racial and national components and 
declared that the federal organization of theYugoslav state endangered Serbian national 
substance, and biological survival itself, claiming that the Serbs were victims of 
discriminatory policies and of an anti-Serbian coalition and conspiracy wherever they 
went. It demanded a change in the constitutional order by recalling the old historic and 
mythical ideas of Greater Serbia. Supposedly this would have enabled the unimpeded 
cultural unification of all Serbs, starting with the abolition of Kosovian autonomy. It was 
the basis for a mobilization of the Serbian population in all parts of the former Yugoslavia. 
The point of departure was created by the revival of conservative nationalist-organicist 
thought in Serbia.51 This line of thought from the turn of the nineteenth century to the 
beginning of the twentieth century, following Charles Maurras and Joseph de Maistre’s 
ideas and combining these with the race ideas of Gustave Le Bon, was amended by the 
works of new ideologists like Dobrica Cosic. The result was combined with ideas of 
Christian collectivism, Pan-Slavism, “missionism,” and the chosen nature of the Serbian 
people (“Christ’s immortal people” in the words of the orthodox priests).52 All this had an 
explicitly anti-Western perspective, since the history of Serbia has been seen as a 
conspiracy of the West against itself. But at the same time, it had as its aim the “salvation 
of the West.” This reinvention of Serbian nationalism was crucial for the development of a 
specific “national revolution,” the leading role of which was taken over politically by 
Milosevic in 1987.
This prewar and interwar development would be more comprehensible, if we 
distinguished, as Arendt did, between two types of nationalisms, although—in the case of 
Yugoslavia we are discussing—the boundaries between these are not as clearly delineated 
as hers: between state-building nationalism and tribal or völkisch nationalism, which has 
Pan-national features, and presents itself as a continuously “unfinished” project, aiming 
at the extension of the national body against state-building. In the face of the assumed 
threats and seemingly enormous ethnic hatreds ,in Yugoslavia it was constructed as a 
“defensive nationalism” and as a drive toward a “natural,” organic community 
(Volksgemeinschaft), which would include all its members against any “artificial 
federation.” As such, it had difficulty accepting the presence of the “Other.” In fact, the 
49 Milosavljevic, U tradiciji nacionalizma, 252ff .
50See Slavenka Drakulićc “We Are All Albanians,” The Nation 268, no. 21 (June 7, 1999); FrankeWilmer, The 
Social Construction of Man, The State and War: Identity, Conflict and Violence in Former Yugoslavia (New 
York and London 2002), 101.
51  For an exhaustive elaboration on this, see Mirko Dordevic, Srpska konzervativna misao [Serbian 
ConservativeThought] (Belgrade, 2003).
52  Radmila Radic, “The Church and the ‘Serbian Question,’” in The Road to War in Serbia, ed. Popov, 251. 
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advocates of “defensive” and “positive”nationalism demanded an “ethnically clean state”; 
and they accepted—through revivals of the old debates—the alleged “voluntary re-
settlement.” However, these old ideas became politically useful only when it seemed as if 
the enormous ethnic hatreds and “old hostilities” had “suddenly” recurred in Yugoslavia 
and when the politics of self-victimization and blaming others became everyday practice. 53 
The consequence was that a solution could not be imagined without changing the ethnic 
composition or affecting “a humane, planned resettlement of population,”54 or what came 
to be known as ethnic cleansing.
Tribal nationalism is thus not the same as ethno-nationalism. If we understand 
ethnonationalism as an endeavor for autonomy and/or independence on the part of the 
population/s, which is already part of a constituted “nation”—in the name of their own 
identity (already existing or in the process of construction),55 then tribal nationalism does 
not have the same features as ethno-nationalism. Ethno-nationalism still represents a 
state- and polity-building endeavor, in spite of its homogenizing potential and exclusivist 
features. Though both these versions of nationalism include the potential for racist 
exclusion and do not have a “pure” appearance, they are to be distinguished in terms of 
their legitimization and their methods of understanding the state and citizenship. In the 
former Yugoslavia, tribal nationalism had to be seen as an addition to and modification of 
nationalism, which was, like German tribal nationalism at the beginning of Nazi-rule, 
successfully hiding its racist core and expansionist face under the “respectable cover of 
ationalism.”56 This is why it was—here as well—“rather difficult to distinguish between 
mere nationalism and clear-cut racism.”57 All seemed to be similar to the “general 
national feelings,” and in the multinational state everyone had—finally—the possibility to 
express his or her feelings loudly and publicly. To distinguish between these elements was 
even more difficult in the case of Milosevic’s Serbia, where an additional “respectable 
cover” existed—not nationalism but the “saving” of Yugoslavia, which extending over the 
core of “Greater Serbia” provided him with international support. This kind of tribal 
nationalism with its racist kernel was misread to a large extent both by the international 
academic community and international actors as a “defense” of the Yugoslav state, 
although its propaganda was, almost from the inception, openly anti-state and genocidal.
To be sure, nationalist revivals and racist elements as parts of tribal or ethn-
onationalisms did not only exist in Serbia or among Serbs. Hierarchical images of “us” 
and “them” and myths of common origin and national mission, as described above, 
developed in Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia as well. No one 
was “innocent” in this regard. In Croatia, where Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic 
Alliance came to power in the first multiparty elections in 1990, tribal nationalists, 
53  In the words of Radovan Karadzic, Bosnian Serb leader, “We cannot live with the Muslims and the Croats, for 
there is too much hatred, centuries of hatred. Serbs fear the Muslims. They cannot live together. Because of 
genocide committed against them (the Serbs), they have to defend themselves.” These words have been 
picked up by the Western media, and “ancient hatred” has become a mantra of which the consequence has 
been the fatalistic notion that the war cannot be stopped (see Bringa, “Averted Gaze,” 197).
54  Olivera Milosavljevic, “New and Old Nationalisms,” Helsinki Files 11. The Balkans Rachomon. 
(http://www.helsinki.org.yu/fi les.php?lang=en), accessed June 20, 2005, 42–5.
55  Dictionary of Race, Ethnicity and Culture, ed. Guido Bolaffi , Raffaele Bracaletni, Peter Braham andSandro 
Gindro (London, 2003), 103–4.
56  Arendt, Origins, 167.
57  Ibid., 165.
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reviving national myths as well as Croatian fascist symbols (Ustasa symbols), completely 
overcame the state-building process and embarked on a total national revolution, thus 
representing an ideal confirmation of the correctness of Milosevic’s “pre-emptive” steps 
and Serbian mass mobilization across all of Yugoslavia. As Croatia was very soon dragged 
into war and lost nearly a third of its territory, the homogenization was almost 
unanimous. This brought about powerful mobilization and expansive military action (not 
defensive alone but military engagement in Bosnia) as well. Soon there were enemies all 
around who were demonized. Not only the Serbian enemy but the Muslims as well were 
acquiring clear racial features of the “Other,” the “intruder,” the “Turks,” and the convert 
among other derogatory designations.58
However, to state that there were “universal” tribal nationalist and racist elements in 
the leadership goals and among parts of the population of all the republics at the time, 
and not only in Serbia, does not mean that they were all “identical” and that they all had 
equal weight or the same power. This would lead us to a type of relativist discourse (they 
were all “equally” bad), which was quite common among interpreters of the Yugoslav war. 
Such talk was basically connected to the alleged ancient hatreds among “Balkan men”—
and probably accounted for many of the totally missed opportunities for intervention on 
the part of the international community. Not everybody was prepared for the war, and the 
least prepared were the Bosnian Muslims, who were viewed both by Serbs and Croats 
outside and within Bosnia either as an “artificial” ethnicity or as a group of national 
traitors, thus representing the most politically weak and potentially superfluous group in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The strongest and the most sustained mobilization of the 
population or war, and for processes that might be compared with those of totalitarian 
movements and developments, existed in Serbia; and the Serbian population in other 
places— such as Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia—was successfully mobilized for tribal 
nationalist goals as well. Together with the racist and völkisch ideology, this could bring 
about conditions for genocidal developments and outcomes. Military engagement and the 
bloody war in Bosnia, the partition of which was secretly agreed on between Milosevic 
and Tudjman in 1991, started to function within a larger plan of “ethnic cleansing.” As 
well, the strife between the two “nationalist” tendencies in Serbia (the dominant 
expansive tribal one and the other, promoting what is called a “modern Serbian state”) 
could never really be resolved and left the Serbian question open, since many never had 
given up the tribal nationalist objectives.59 By this, of course I do not mean to deny that 
similar developments took place in Croatia, for example, or that they would not have been 
be possible, under certain conditions, in any of the other Yugoslav nations (for example in 
Kosovo after 1999). On the contrary. But though the elements were present everywhere, 
they would not necessarily crystallize into the same murderous events. Tribal 
nationalisms have used race thinking and racist endeavors to fix and naturalize hierarchic 
58 Tudjman suggested to Western diplomats that Croatia was fighting its war against Muslim fundamentalism. 
Bringa, “Averted Gaze,” 241. For more about the development of Croatian nationalism, the Ustasa legacy and 
extremist developments, including racist dimensions, see Irvine, “Balkan Authoritarian Ultranationalist 
Ideology and State-Building in Croatia.”
59  This is one of the reasons that the prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, who had been the representative of 
“modern liberal nationalism,” was assassinated in 2003. Latinka Perovic, “The Sociopolitical and Ethno-
religious Dimension of Wars in Yugoslavia,” in The Violent Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Causes, Dynamics and 
Eff ects, ed. Miroslav Hadzic (Belgrade 2004), 123–4.
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images of simple, logical race relations, the images of which were more than a product of 
“domestic” Yugoslav fabrication: such images were also nurtured by European and global 
clashes. They legitimized special demographic policies, exclusion, and subsequent ethnic 
resettlement as “lesser evils,” and that paved the way for the ethnic cleansing and 
attempted annihilation of certain groups. Even the idea of legitimate “removals of 
populations” and ethnic cleansing itself created a condition of “inverse order,” where one 
could first imagine, then easily “slip” into excesses and, finally, plan genocidal endeavors. 
Tribal nationalisms show a general trend: every nationalism, be it defensive or whatever, 
indulges in racism, in fact, if and when it denies universal equality and common 
humanity. Tribal nationalisms have their place among those policies and movements, 
which, from the position of “scientifi cally” supported race thinking, reorganize 
populations as separate bodies in the name of “cleanliness” and “purity.” Such 
developments take place at all times when equality is perverted “from a political into a 
social concept,” “the state into an instrument of the nation” and when parts of the 
population can be defined as “separate bodies.”60 Although the point of transgression—as 
shown by Arendt—is inherent in the sovereign structure of the nationstate itself, such a 
point of transgression does not play a decisive role as long as it is limited politically. 
Whether these elements are going to develop into genocidal events does not depend on 
the “nature” of nationalism—on its being “good”or “bad,” “aggressive” or “defensive,” 
Slovenian, Serbian, Albanian, or whatever it might be—but on its limitation by the state as 
a political institution, by the rule of law and constitutional government and by citizens’ 
actions and judgment. As soon as we move out of the nation-state frame, as a polity 
framework one can expect the deadly fusion of racism and nationalism. In Yugoslavia the 
state, though authoritarian, ceased to exist. With the spreading of the tribal-nationalist 
shield against it, so did the ground for thinking and judgment. This had lethal 
consequences wherever the state could not be reconstructed, as was the situation in 
Bosnia, since nothing could have replaced it in time: neither the international community 
nor even less the UN protection.
Srebrenica and Banality
They told us that the Muslims were scum, more or less. That you would do well to have 
nothing to do with them. That actually the women and children were always nice . . . But 
the men with their big mouths, you should have nothing to do with them. The lads told us 
that Serbian men were better to deal with than Muslim men. They were much better 
disciplined.
—Dutch/ UN soldier in Srebrenica.
In 1993 a UN “safe area” with a few hundred peacekeepers was created in the eastern 
Bosnian town of Srebrenica to protect the remaining Muslim population gathered in that 
part of partitioned Bosnia after the Bosnian Serb Army occupation. In spite of this status, 
in July 1995, the enclave, together with more than 20,000 refugees, fell into the hands of 
Bosnian Serb troops under the leadership of General Ratko Mladic. Between 7,000 and 
8,000 men aged twelve to sixty were killed within a very short time span. The weak UN 
60 Arendt, Origins, 138, 231.
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battalion of Dutch soldiers was neither able nor willing, nor possessed of the mandate, to 
protect the enclave and the population. In that situation almost no one acted or judged, 
and the Dutch battalion commander, receiving no help from UN headquarters, under the 
circumstances even made an agreement with the Bosnian Serb general Mladic about the 
“transfer of the population.” His soldiers stood by while Mladic’s troops separated the 
men from the women and children. Before the well-organized executions of Muslim men, 
young and old, were carried out, Mladic proved efficiently the (non)earnestness and 
(non)willingness of the UN forces to protect the Muslim population. After kidnapping a 
group of Dutch soldiers, he threatened to kill the hostages if there were a NATO bombing. 
Air strikes ordered against him were cancelled by UN headquarters. Consequently, the 
unprotected enclave fell into the hands of Bosnian Serb militias, the Serbian secret police, 
and paramilitary troops. They immediately began the work of selection, transportation, 
and execution, under the pretext of organizing a “transfer of population” to the Muslim 
territories only. Those responsible in the UN did not take seriously warnings about the 
danger of a massacre, nor did they immediately report the early evidence of killings. The 
Dutch commander even evaluated Mladic’s action as an “excellently planned military 
operation.”61 The probable estimate of the number of the genocide victims is 7,536, but 
only a few of them were identified.62
How was it possible that mass killings such as the one at Srebrenica took place? Why 
would people organize and mobilize for violence and killing? Were their motives racism 
and nationalism? The terrible role of the Serb Bosnian military leaders, professionals who 
“organized, planned and willingly participated in genocide or stood silent in the face of 
it”63 must be queried along with the roles of immediate perpetrators like the soldiers, 
paramilitaries, and volunteers. Questions must beraised also concerning the role of the 
bystanders supposed to be protectors, such as the UN Dutch battalion, and the role of the 
international community as well.What happened to them? Why did they not act? 64
There is no doubt that, after occupying the Srebrenica territory, the Bosnian Serb 
military leaders under the command of General Mladic intended to kill eventually as 
61  Samantha Power, ”A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (London, 2003), 417.
62  Helge Brunborg, Torkild Hovde Lyngstad and Henrik Urdal, “Accounting for Genocide: How Many Were 
Killed in Srebrenica?” European Journal of Population 19 (2003): 244. About the Srebrenica case, see David 
Rhode, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica (New York, 1997); Michael N. Barnett, “The Politics of 
Indifference at the United Nations and Genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia,” in This Time we Knew: Western 
Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, ed. Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic (New York, 1996), 128–162, 
Jan Williem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime (Harmondsworth, 1996); David 
Rieff , A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York, 2003); Julija Bogoeva and Caroline 
Fetcher, Srebrenica. Ein Prozess, Dokumente und Materialien aus dem UN-Kriegsverbrechertribunal in Den 
Haag (Frankfurt am-Main, 2002). For detailed research into the UN Dutch battalion role in Srebrenica, see 
the report of The Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), Srebrenica – a ‘safe’area. The fall of 
a Safe Area Reconstruction, background consequences and analyses of the fall of the Safe Area. 
(http://213.222.3.5/srebrenica/), accessed September 5, 2005. A deeply shocking BBC documentary about 
the mass atrocities in Srebrenica is A Cry From the Grave.
63  Slavenka Drakulic, They Would Never Hurt a Fly: War Criminals on Trial in The Hague (London, 2004), 75.
64 These issues were thoroughly worked out by Arne J. Vetlesen, who develops a typology of bystanders to 
genocide and defines groups of bystanders: those directly in charge of the situation and those responsible in 
the loose sense of being cognizant of genocide through television, radio, newspapers, and other public media, 
but not directly involved in it (neither by profession nor by formal appointment) and then asks a question 
about the status of (non)action in such cases. See his “Genocide: A Case for the Responsibility of the 
Bystander,” Journal of Peace Research [Special Issue on Ethics of War and Peace] 37, no. 4 (2000): 519–532.
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many men as possible of fighting age and that the plan was carried out as a well-planned 
and rapidly organized military operation. Overall, 17,342 members of military units and 
1,988 members of the police, regardless of their function, were in one way or another 
involved in the events of Srebrenica’s mass killings.65 Also evident are the “unclear 
mission” of the UN peacekeepers, the grave mistakes, the absence of judgment, and the 
many omissions of the UN headquarters in Zagreb. Their situation as the supposed 
protectors of Srebrenica, yet who saw their mission as absurd, was obviously an 
impossible one. But this cannot answer the above questions.
An attempt to explain the involvement of direct perpetrators and collaborators in the 
organization of the massacres might oscillate between two interpretations.The dominant 
one is that people participated, used violence, and killed because of fanatical nationalism 
and hatred, and because they were manipulated by elites. Yet, despite the power of tribal 
nationalist ideologies and their persuasive effects on the elites and masses, analyses of the 
genocide and “ethnic violence” from Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Ireland, Sudan, and 
Australia, suggests that ethnic hatred itself might not be as a powerful tool for direct 
mobilization as is usually maintained.66 This reveals a contradiction in any explanation 
that insists on the ideological intentionalist interpretation. Hatred, desire for vengeance, 
and a desire for ethnic cleansing might be involved here, though they are not in the initial 
plan. 
On the one hand, there is no doubt that patterns of war, genocide, and rape in the 
former Yugoslavia were present in the public conduct—as described above—before the 
real violence took place, and the war started. Tribal nationalisms with their neo-racist 
features created a discursive script for violence and facilitated its normalization, 
crystallizing in practices of “ethnic cleansing.” But these developments were neither 
natural nor the result of simple indoctrination. They emerged out of the transformation of 
reality itself. The belief that abuse, manipulation, and “evil” were on the side of the power 
elites and politicians only, who skilfully and consciously used racist and tribal ideologies, 
while the people (or “masses”) were just obedient, innocent, naturally good and/or misled 
by leaders like Milosevic in Serbia or Tudjman in Croatia is similarly questionable. Too 
many facts contradict such a conclusion. First, among the crucial conditions for 
Milosevic’s successful policy in Serbia (as well as the effects—later, in the war—of 
Tudjman’s policy in Croatia) were an elite-mob connection and a mob mobilization. The 
“meetings of truth” supporting Milosevic in the second half of the 1980s were well-
organized and-sponsored public rallies held all over Yugoslavia with the aim of removing 
non-coordinated party leaders. This was a pretext for the successful mobilization of the 
Serb population outside of Serbia and for the total division later in Bosnia. Something 
very close to the totalitarian manipulation of elements was generated “until reality 
vanished.” The masses, as well as intellectuals, media, and the general public, participated 
in the fabrication of their own and ultimate “truths” and myths, and in a total 
reorganization of memory. Second, mobilization was perpetrated through the 
65  See James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 
International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 845–878
66 Mamdani, who made a detailed analysis of the Rwandan mobilization for genocide, sees such reasoning as a 
great problem in academic writing, which likes to see genocide as “designed from above” and hesitates to 
acknowledge the action and initiative from below. Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 8.
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mobilization of thugs, hooligans, and football fans, who introduced violence, ritual, and 
symbolic warfare and, finally, served as a resource for the paramilitary troops for the war. 
They became the “weekend warriors.”67
Similar to what Arendt described as the German case under Nazi rule, circumstances of 
“inverted order” were created, in which “the battle for destiny” of the Serbian people was 
at stake. In Bosnia, this caused the rapid development of total divisions and policies of 
ethnic separation, especially since, after the multiparty elections, power was divided 
exclusively along ethnic lines. Such self–deception was the reason that large parts of the 
Serbian intellectual and political elite could claim—by the middle of war—that Serbia was 
“not at the war,” “that (war) was started by destiny, not by them” and “that it was a matter 
of life or death for them, who must annihilate (their) enemies or be annihilated.”68 For 
similar reasons after the war, there was a strong denial in Serbia of events like that at 
Srebrenica and a mass mobilization against the extradition of war criminals, both in 
Serbia and Croatia. The background for such an inversion was constructed by a racialized 
reality, and a majority mentality similar to Eichmann’s thoughtlessness, or, as PrimoLevi 
called it, the “will not to know.”69
Contrary to the insistence on ethnic hatred, and racist and ideological indoctrination or 
blindness, studies of genocide and mass violence have suggested that “ethnic” violence 
was neither a “motive in itself ” nor a development from the masses after being duped by 
the elites: “Rather… [it] can be a cover for other motivations such as looting, land grabs, 
and personal revenge, and the activities of thugs set loose by the politicians.”70 The 
personal motivations that lie behind genocidal violence between and among neighbors 
might have little to do with ideology as a “motivation resource.” This has been proven in 
the context of collective violence in traditional warfare, where comradeship not hatred is 
the dominant battle motivation, and the main actors are “terrifyingly normal men” whose 
killing is “more or less a product of modern culture.”71 Within the inversion of order and 
rules (when killing is no longer necessarily a crime), there are certain “pleasures of war” 
that are inculcated, encouraged, and maintained in the tradition of warfare and killing to 
make warfare attractive and psychologically endurable.72
Concentrating on the way perpetrators and collaborators were mobilized for genocide, 
J. Mueller argues that the factual mechanism of violence in the former Yugoslavia was 
“remarkably banal” and that it did not reflect deep, historic passions and hatreds. It 
seems that the immediate violence was rather “the result of a situation in which common, 
opportunistic, sadistic, and often distinctly non-ideological marauders were recruited and 
permitted free rein by political authorities.”73 The Hague criminal tribunal trials have 
provided much material in support of such claims. Not surprisingly, the usual attitude of 
67  Such was the case of the Belgrade Red Star football club fans, who became the real “warriors“, the so called 
“Arkan’s Tigers,” and engaged in the war in Bosnia. See Ivan Colovic, “Football, Hooligans and War,” in The 
Road to War, ed. Popov, 373–396.
68 See Arendt, Eichmann, 52,
69 Primo Levi, If this is a Man/The Truce (London, 2003), 386.
70  Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction,” 874.
71  Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle, Introduction Hannah Arendt (Lincoln and London 
1970; reprint 1998), xviii
72  See Joanna Bourke An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare 
(London,1999), 13ff .
73  John Mueller, “The Banality of Ethnic War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 43.
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the defendants was one of “not guilty,” since they had had no “intention” of perpetrating 
mass murder or war crimes. Slavenka Drakulic, who belongs among those authors who 
have increasingly begun to think in terms of the “banality” of perpetrators, introducing 
terminology used by Arendt in Eichmann in Jerusalem,74 has analysed profiles of the 
perpetrators convicted of genocide and war crimes in the Yugoslav war and the Srebrenica 
mass murders. She shows that there is nothing monstrous about the perpetrators as 
people and that they are not evil nor beasts. Rather, they are “ordinary people” who 
became involved with violence and organized executions through professional or other 
decisions and took small steps in their lives without much reflection. “Ordinary thinking 
man” was neither inevitably a nationalist nor a madman, just someone who, when “given 
a chance to kill on apparently legitimate grounds and, in addition, to enrich himself by 
looting his victims, . . . did not think twice.”75 In fact, not only were they not necessarily 
fanatics, their motives simply did not count. But this was no Balkan peculiarity. Other 
instances of collective violence show similar features. Such perpetrators exist in all 
societies, thus similar events could, under the right circumstances, happen almost 
anywhere, including in Western societies. Furthermore, being aware of this fact (and not 
demonizing the perpetrators), one can go on to claim that the tragedies that overcame 
Bosnia, Croatia, and Rwanda could have been avoided. They could perhaps have been 
manageable with “different policing and accommodation procedures,” if there were no 
monstrous and fatal evil supposed to be hidden behind them but simply human action 
and omission, and if they were not inevitably seen as springing automatically from a 
single cause or origin. These tragedies were the result neither of “inevitable historic 
necessities” nor of “ancient hatreds,” but were provoked by the human actions of political 
leaders, local extremists, or thugs whose violence got out of control.76
Yet, if the mechanism of violence itself is banal, if the perpetrators are not stimulated 
by their hate, what is the role of widespread and seemingly overwhelming ethnic hatred, 
racist images, and ideologies of tribal nationalism that I have also been discussing? What 
role does racism play in the process of mass killing and of crimes against humanity, if it is 
not the immediate trigger? The provisional answer might be that such tribal nationalisms, 
racist ideologies and images provide, above all, a rationalizing frame for perpetrators who 
have primarily banal motivations but not the immediate thrust to act. These bring about 
the idea of extinction of the “other,” demonstrate his superfluity; but it is up to the 
“banally evil” agents to carry out the more or less dirty task. Perhaps one can assume that 
racism (like anti-Semitism) gets lost in the process of extermination, and the “movement” 
itself takes the lead.77
However the dilemma does not really consist of a necessary choice between evil 
intentions, fanatical beliefs, and banal, mindless perpetrators or coalitions of the elite-
masses. Rather one might think about the fact that both the elite and the masses share a 
common “ontological ground” which is actually banal and banally produced as well.78 This 
74  For example: Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, 1997), 
228–238 and Mueller, “The Banality of Ethnic War,” International Security 25, no. 1(2000): 42–73.
75  Drakulic, They Would Never Hurt a Fly, 167.
76  See Mueller, “The Banality of Ethnic War,” 67ff .
77  See footnote 27.
78  Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction,” 86.
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is not a fixed and unchangeable culture or “ancient hatred.” On the contrary, it is a 
constructed reality, a fabricated framework, which includes discursively constructed 
“scripts,” myths of common origin, and easy historic explanations about “Us” and 
“Them”—foreigners, evildoers, and thus our enemies—which can be employed in present 
situations not only to produce feelings of fear and danger but to be an effective shield 
against any other reality. Here, emotions of hatred need not be included in the common 
picture, which is taken for granted, although, to be sure, they might exist beyond the 
common picture. Such a shield, a fabricated truth or image, seems to function as a process 
of ideological interpellation. It is not an essentialist demiurge but reproduced and 
manipulated by the actors themselves, left, so to speak, for their own personal use. 
Individuals are not indoctrinated but eventually come to occupy the “common ontological 
ground,” which they coordinate and reshape with their own actions and omissions. This 
fabricated reality, as I tried to indicate in the first part of the chapter when talking about 
the Arendtian notion of ideology, is itself “banal.” It is superficial, “thought defying,” as 
Arendt wrote to Gershom Scholem, and facilitates self-deception. Such a banal “reality” 
might, of course, be diverse, but the hierarchic images of racialized relations, established 
through the tribal nationalist engagement, are sufficiently convenient, especially as they 
do not have to show their straightforward racist face but can be hidden—these days—
under the respectable cover of cultural differences.
Not only the perpetrators and their collaborators but also the international 
professionals and bystanders have been caught in the self-made trap of such realities. 
This element belongs to the overall picture of bystander indifference and the conduct of 
the Dutch battalion. The Dutch soldiers were trained to accept an incredibly rigid and 
homogenized image both of the situation in the “Balkans” and of Bosnian Muslims, who 
were shown as the worst of the “Balkan men”—depicted literally as “the Other.”’79 Faced 
with a situation without resources and under threat of their lives, they could easily 
disavow not only their professional but also their human responsibilities. To be sure, not 
only the Dutch soldiers shared a well-established, differentiated image of the Balkan 
populations. The message of the UN and the Dutch government was clear: Bosnian 
Muslim lives were not as valuable as those of UN soldiers. This has made the event at 
Srebrenica—like the genocide in Rwanda one year before—“more than a crime” but an 
event that “shamed humanity.”80
Conclusion: The Yugoslav Elements—Old and New
What happened at Srebrenica had elements both of administrative mass murder and 
features of face-to-face killing and massacre. In this sense, it reminds us of both the 
Holocaust and the administrative massacres from colonial times. The “administrative” 
aspect of the mass murder lies not only in the perfect planning and organization of the 
killings, which took place in a very short time span, but in the interwoven test of stories: 
79  NIOD, Srebrenica – a ‘safe’ area, (http://213.222.3.5/srebrenica/toc/p2_c08-s003_b01.html), accessed 
September 5, 2005.
80 See Mark Huband in Roy Gutman and David Rieff , Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know (New York 
and London 1999), 314, and Vetlesen, “Genocide: A Case,” 531.
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of the deeds and guilt of the immediate perpetrators; stories of the deeds and nondeeds, 
responsibility, and guilt of those who were directly in charge of the situation in the UN 
protected area, and stories about the part played by the international military and 
administrative structure responsible for protecting the lives of the Muslim refugees. The 
path toward the mass murder of Srebrenica, called “the worst massacre in Europe after 
the second WorldWar,” demonstrates how in Bosnia, through silent or open agreement 
with policies of “ethnic cleansing” and step by step, conditions involving “holes of 
oblivion” were established for a dreadful “solution” to the problem of those who had been 
rendered superfluous (in this case the Muslim population), and how judgment, 
responsibility, capacity, and readiness for action to prevent the murders could simply 
retreat from sight. The mass murder had been organized in such a way that even ordinary 
people, the population in general, either supported the perpetrators or directly 
participated in the killings, and was thus organized into guilt in the Arendtian sense. 
Finally, the outcome, while taking place within regional borders, offer lessons much 
broader than local or regional ones, and poses questions similar to those arising from the 
crisis of the European nation-state in the first half of the twentieth century. The outcome 
crystallized worldwide changes in the global policies of superpowers: the dawning of the 
era of so-called “humanitarian interventionism” and of the wars against terror.
These events were not only “repetitions,” since novel elements and new forms emerged: 
in Bosnia, mass rape was part of the enterprise of annihilation of the Other, and cases of 
forced impregnation of women from the other ethnic group demonstrated a post-racist 
imagery in the annihilation practices. The killings, as illustrated by the shelling of 
Sarajevo, took place either before the very eyes of the “international community” and 
millions of virtual witnesses or, as in the case of Srebrenica, even with the collaboration 
(“standing by”) of international forces, who were supposed to protect the population 
under threat. Srebrenica and the siege of Sarajevo, where Bosnian Serbian soldiers and 
weekend fighters served eight hour shifts of shelling daily, before the eyes of the 
international community, were among the unprecedented examples of the functioning of 
post-totalitarian elements under new circumstances. They both reflect more than just a 
war and a crime perpetrated as a consequence of racist endeavour. Was the mass murder 
of Srebrenica in Bosnia not the test case of the potential universal features of tribal 
nationalisms, the banality of evil, thoughtlessness, and of Eichmann-mentality in the 
post-totalitarian age within Europe itself—despite their relegation to the Balkans? Only 
here, apart from the direct perpetrators, the global bystanders, Eichmann’s children, in 
the words of Günther Anders,81 have also been included in the common picture. As Arendt 
enlightened us, the new predicaments might not look like the cruellest, at least not at first 
sight, but they might have the cruellest consequences imaginable.
81  This is the title of Günther Anders’s (Stern) not widely known book in German, Wir, Eichmannsöhne, Brief 
an Klaus Eichmann (Muenchen, 1988) [We, Sons of Eichmann: A Letter to Klaus Eichmann]. Anders, 
Arendt’s first husband, closely analyses the procedures of self–deception within a modern society of 
unlimited fabrication. He describes this problem in terms of a discrepancy between Herstellen (fabrication, 
the technically feasible) and Vorstellen (imagination), whereby the unimaginable (Unvorstellbare) always 
tends to be fabricated if we fear to think about the consequences of our actions. See 24 ff .
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